USCGC BERTHOLF is floating

[BMCM Stuart S. Slesh]

Well she has water under the keel. CG emblem to be added after sea trials.....

[SKC Ronald Brumble]

Ok, I'm not a structural engineer or anything close to it. But do the "Divots/dents" in the spot forward of the racing strip mean anything? Why would a brand new ship have those on there?

Just curious

[MKC Art Bailly (ret)]

Ron I noticed that also. A new ship and the ribs are already showing? At least from the picture it looks like very poor workman ship. The ship looks like it’s already ridden out several huge storms already. I’m sure we will except it has is. I have been threw a pre-com and shocked at some of the crap we except. Some of the things I’ve seen. Just a few examples, there were Fire Main(and other systems but fire main is pretty important) valve’s plumed/installed wrong to were you couldn’t open the valve all the way (we had to cut handle so we could open/close Fuel and cooling water valves) they only time you could pump the bilges with the install system was when their was several feet of water in it, we had to hook up additional suction pumps to pump waste oil of the ship because the install system didn’t work. Paint not dry after several months because they didn’t mix they paint properly, out fit items missing, and who do you think fixed all the problems? That’s right we did. On some of the warranty issue they sent us the parts and they ships crew fixed the problem. I couldn’t believe they actually signed for the ship. I know if I were spending that kind of money on something everything would be working right before I signed. It all came down to politics and OER’s. We got X amount of cutters out on time. Things that make you go Hmmm.

[BMCS Dave Considine]

All I can think of when I see the picture of her is "Spy vs Spy". I am waiting for the black hull version.

Dave

[BMC Ken Gouge]

The metal around the anchor pocket is stainless steel to reduce wear anmd tear/rust (to bad they haven't invested in stainless anchors and chain yet). The metal just aft is probably 1/4" or thinner steel. A DC could give you the particulars, but when they weld the steel to the frames it warps.

[BMCS Dave Considine]

Received this e-mail from the Chiefs network. The "Christening" will be covered by a live webcast at Deepwater Website (http://www.teamdeepwater.com) on Saturday.

Master Chief: As discussed, can you please share within the Chiefs’ network? Wouldn’t want anyone to miss the opportunity to view the web cast on Saturday morning! Thanks very much, r, ME



FIRST NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER TO BE CHRISTENED ‘BERTHOLF’ THIS SATURDAY IN PASCAGOULA

Christening event to be web cast live at 10 a.m. in its entirety at www.teamdeepwater.com

PASCAGOULA, Miss. (November 7, 2006) – On Veterans’ Day, this Saturday, Nov. 11, Meryl Justin Chertoff, wife of Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, will break a bottle of champagne across the bow of the U.S. Coast Guard’s first-of-class Deepwater National Security Cutter christening her USCGC BERTHOLF (WMSL 750) at Northrop Grumman’s shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss.

U.S. Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) will deliver the principal address at the christening event. Guest speakers will also include Secretary Chertoff, Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thad Allen and Deepwater Program Executive Officer Rear Adm. Gary T. Blore. More than 300 Coast Guard veterans from the World War II, Korean and Vietnam eras have been invited to attend the christening which is expected to draw more than 1,000 people.

BERTHOLF is the first new cutter to be delivered through the Deepwater program and the first new high endurance cutter built for the Coast Guard in 35 years. The last cutter was USCGC MIDGETT, the twelfth and final of the Coast Guard's fleet of 378-foot cutters which was built at Northrop Grumman’s Avondale facility in 1971.

The first National Security Cutter is named in honor of the Coast Guard’s first commandant, Ellsworth Price Bertholf (1866-1921). On Jan. 28, 1915, when President Woodrow Wilson signed a law consolidating the Revenue Cutter Service and the U.S. Life Saving Service, he accepted Bertholf's suggestion that 'Coast Guard' was the logical name for the combined agency. As the first commandant, Bertholf was instrumental in implementing the successful merger of the two services.

BERTHOLF is a 418-foot ship with a 4,300-ton displacement at full load. Powered by a twin screw combined diesel and gas turbine propulsion plant, she is designed to travel at 28 knots maximum speed. The cutter includes an aft launch and recovery area for two rigid hull inflatable boats, a flight deck to accommodate a range of manned and unmanned rotary wing aircraft, and advanced command and control and communications systems. In partnership with the Coast Guard, Integrated Coast Guard Systems – a joint venture of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman – has been working side-by-side to deliver a cutter that is not only capable and flexible, but also economical and enduring.



# # #

Deepwater News Flash is part of a continuous effort to improve information flow to employees across our program. This periodic e-mail was created to highlight significant program milestones and achievements. If you were accidentally included on this distribution, or are aware of someone who wishes to be added, please return reply or send a note to troy.r.scully@lmco.com or abby.cruikshank@dwicgs.com.

(News Flash 2006/022)


Also the second cutter's keel was laid:
DEEPWATER LAYS KEEL FOR SECOND NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER WAESCHE CEREMONY OCCURS ON PATRIOTS' DAY - Rear Adm. Gary T. Blore, program executive officer of the Integrated Deepwater System, initials the keel plate for the National Security Cutter WAESCHE during the cutter's keel laying ceremony at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems's shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss., Sept. 11, 2006. Northrop Grumman welder Willis "Willie" Griffin looks on. Griffin, a shipyard employee since 1968, subsequently welded Rear Adm. Blore's initials into the WAESCHE's keel plate to signify its keel is "truly and fairly laid" as the second cutter in the Coast Guard's new Legend class

[MKC Wayne Cox]

Yes the steel warps during welding. Some come out smooth as a babies bottom, some look like that. And that looks like crap. But, anyone that has ever been in on the contracting side knows that if you don't address that stuff specifically in the contract, you get it as they interperit it. And if warped sheetmetal ain't adressed, so be it.

[SKC Ronald Brumble]

Wayne, I'll have to keep that in mind if I ever start doing those kinds of contracts.

[BMC John Phillips III]

For you Engineer types, (I found this on wikipedia)

[BMCS Dave Considine]

More bad news for Deepwater and the Coast Guard. An article entitled "Lawmakers Say Coast Guard Withheld Warning of Flaws in Cutter Design" in the NY Times says CG officials withheld warnings by the Chief engineer that there are flaws in the New Cutter.

See the article here. Ramifications of this are probably going to be big.

NY Times Article on Deepwater (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/14/washington/14cutter.html)

[BMCM Stuart S. Slesh]

Dave, don't put too much stock in media reports........ Talk to anyone who has talked to the media, and hasn't been misquoted or taken out of context.

Food for though........ say some CG engineers, be they MK3s or actually design engineers were talking about the BERTOFF and said something to the fact that, if they expect to get the life out of her the way the got life out of the 180s, they're going to have to eventually strengthen her hull. How would the media report that ?

If they want me to believe anything they say, put a name to the quote. I want to be able to see what role that "Coast Guard engineer" played in designing the hull that they're panning. I just don't put a lot of reliablity into unnamed sources.

[MKC Craig Thorngren (Ret)]

Stu,
Maybe I'm missing it, but what quote in the article isn't attributed to an individual? I've read Adm. Brown's memo, and seen the CG's response to the questions raised. I'll admit alot of the article is sensationalism and congressional folks trying to get free media time with some choice words, but it appears when you break down the story to it's meat and bones, it's pretty accurate...

Craig

[BMCM Stuart S. Slesh]

Craig, other than quips from ADM Brown's letter, and some members of Congress joining the pile-on, which quotes ARE attributed to a person.
I read alot of Coast Guard engineers said, or Coast Guard Leaders have said,...may and might... When they list their unnammed sources it's always plural, leaving the impressions that everyone or at least lots of people agree. They also throw alot of no comments and retirements around. Publishing a no comment leaves the reader thinking the person has something to hide. They even have the COMDT trying to glaze over the situation, eluding to his brief comments, and acting as though what little he did say, comfirmed their story.
I don't see the meat and bones,...... I see blood in the water and the sharks are gathering.

[BMCS Dave Considine]

MC

I really hope you're right, don't want to see something like this slow down the forward momentum the CG is enjoying right now.

[MKC Craig Thorngren (Ret)]

I'm sorry I can't get back to the article (I'm not paying the NYTIMES for anything :D ). When the article was free, the also had a link to a scanned copy of ADM Brown's memo, and the official CG response to the engineering concerns. Though what they wrote wasn't a direct quote (if they did it would be a lot less sensationalism...), the CG's response to the hull issues, was basically "yes" those are issues that they are going to deal with in hulls #3 thru #8, because to try and correct them now would be prohibitively expensive. When hull #1&2 came up for dry dock, those items would be corrected then. It appears as with most things in the CG, it comes down to money.
As for "I see blood in the water and the sharks are gathering" you are absolutely correct. I'm not positive which thread it was in, but someone asked "what have we got for all the money spent on deepwater" (or to that affect), and MKCM Brett Ayer's response was something like "a really nice brochure". As much as I hate to agree with that statement, it appears to be true. If we have received more, then the CG is doing a pretty poor job of telling other Coasties about it, let alone congress.
My belief is that if we were only having problems with one of the many projects of Deep Water it wouldn't be that big of a deal. A project of this size and magnitude is bound to have some setbacks or mistakes. The issue is that, at least by appearances, almost each major asset of Deep Water has serious problems.
My fear though is that "with the blood in the water" some talented individuals who might be able to help correct some of these problems are going to shy away from it or try to avoid it all together because if it gets worse it could be detrimental to their career.

Craig

[BMC Ken Gouge]

One MAJOR problem with any government expentiture of this magnitude and timeframe, is that the ones who had the plan and got the ball rolling have since transferred or retired, as will happen about 7 times over the course of Deepwater (or is it now "hot water" :confused: )

[BMC Ken Gouge]

One MAJOR problem with any government expentiture of this magnitude and timeframe, is that the ones who had the plan and got the ball rolling have since transferred or retired, as will happen about 7 times over the course of Deepwater (or is it now "hot water" :confused: )

Are they sitting on their couch reading the NY times thinking "that isn't what I had drawn up..."?

[BMCM Stuart S. Slesh]

Craig, every hull we've had has gone through changes during production. We have three classes of 110' and three classess of 65's. The First 65's aren't even 65 feet. I don't know how many changes the 87's have adapted since we started rolling those out. The whole thing is about taking things out of context. I'll agree that the Coast Guard is planning improvements on future hulls...... I'm not willing to accept that the BERTOFF is not capable of performing. I'm not willing to accept that we know that from the beginning and spent 540 million on her anyway.
And don't worry about the talanted people shying away from the challenges that are still ahead of us...... the cream always rises to the top. Really talented people will see this as an opportunity to shine. Regardless of what the papers are saying, we have the Coast Guard leaders that are going to get this job done.

[BMCS T. D. Ellis]

And don't worry about the talanted people shying away from the challenges that are still ahead of us...... the cream always rises to the top. Really talented people will see this as an opportunity to shine. Regardless of what the papers are saying, we have the Coast Guard leaders that are going to get this job done.

...no matter what self-imposed challenges that we should have solved before we got the ball rolling and ended up spending more money and removing this egg from our faces.

[BMCM Stuart S. Slesh]

Why self-imposed challenges ? Some of the things that we faced were because we had to work within the bondaries of government contracts. You've done a yard package before. Some things can only be solved by spending money........

[BMC John Phillips III]

The New York Times, yes, I would agree "Sensationalism" for sure. I love when reporters use quotes as facts to suit their agendas.

[BMCS Dave Considine]

For those at home during the Holidays, here's the COMDT's e-mail to all hands.

1. BY NOW, YOU ALL HAVE PROBABLY SEEN ARTICLES ON THE DEEPWATER
PROGRAM IN THE NEWSPAPER OR ONLINE. THIS SUNDAY, THE MIAMI HERALD
PUBLISHED A PIECE I WROTE PERSONALLY TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES RAISED.
GIVEN ITS IMPORTANCE TO OUR READINESS AND POST-9/11 MISSION
EXECUTION, YOU NEED TO KNOW WHERE I STAND REGARDING THIS CRITICAL
PROGRAM.
2. AS I SAID IN MY COMMANDANTS INTENT MESSAGE LAST MAY, YOU MUST
HAVE THE TOOLS AND SUPPORT YOU NEED TO DO YOUR JOB. THIS IS WHY
DEEPWATER IS SO CRITICAL. IT WILL DELIVER THE MOST CAPABLE MULTI-
MISSION SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, AND COMMAND-AND-CONTROL SYSTEMS AVAILABLE.
WHILE WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED SOME SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES, I ASK EACH
OF YOU TO AVOID RUSHING TO JUDGMENT DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THIS
COMPLEX AND LONG TERM ACQUISITION.
3. OUR PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS HAVE CENTERED ON STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES
DURING CONVERSION OF 110-FOOT PATROL BOATS TO 123S, THE DESIGN OF
THEIR COMPOSITE HULLED REPLACEMENT, THE FAST RESPONSE CUTTER (FRC)
AND SERVICE LIFE ISSUES WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER (NSC).
THIS MONTH, I TOOK THE 123S OUT OF SERVICE FOR CREW SAFETY AND
OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY REASONS, TWO AREAS WHERE WE WILL ACCEPT NO
COMPROMISE.
4. WE DEFERRED DESIGN WORK ON THE COMPOSITE FRC EARLIER THIS YEAR
WHEN TECHNICAL CONCERNS WERE IDENTIFIED. SINCE THEN, WE EXAMINED
THE SUITABILITY OF EXISTING IN-SERVICE DESIGNS TO PROCURE A PROVEN
PATROL BOAT TO ADDRESS OUR URGENT OPERATIONAL NEEDS. WE ISSUED A
REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL AND EXPECT DESIGNS FOR A REPLACEMENT PATROL
BOAT BY MARCH 2007.
5. GIVEN THE COMPLEXITY OF SHIP DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION, IT IS NOT
UNUSUAL FOR LEAD SHIPS OF A NEW CLASS TO REQUIRE SOME DESIGN
MODIFICATIONS. DURING THE CONSTRUCTION OF OUR FIRST NSC, COAST
GUARD ENGINEERS DETERMINED THAT SOME SHIP STRUCTURES REQUIRED
STRENGTHENING TO INCREASE THE SERVICE LIFE OF THE SHIP. WE WILL
MAKE THOSE ENHANCEMENTS.
6. CRITICISMS OF THE DEEPWATER PROGRAM SHOULD NOT MASK THE
PROGRESS WE ARE MAKING IN OTHER AREAS, NOTABLY C4ISR UPGRADES TO
LEGACY CUTTERS, RE-ENGINING OF HH-65 HELICOPTERS, THE
MISSIONIZATION OF HC-130J AIRCRAFT, AND DELIVERY OF OUR FIRST NEW
HC-144A MEDIUM RANGE MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT.
7. WE HAVE AN URGENT NEED TO RECAPITALIZE OUR AGING FLEET. OUR
FUTURE READINESS DEPENDS ON IT, AND I AM FULLY COMMITTED TO THIS
EFFORT. SIGNIFICANT MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO IMPROVE DEEPWATER
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, AND WE WILL IMPLEMENT OTHERS DURING THE YEAR
AHEAD. MORE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT, SOUND STEWARDSHIP OF TAXPAYER
DOLLARS, AND TIMELY DELIVERY OF MUCH-NEEDED ASSETS ARE THE
WATCHWORDS FOR DEEPWATER. WE ARE PURSUING ALL EFFORTS WITH A GREAT
SENSE OF URGENCY. ANYTHING LESS IS UNACCEPTABLE. DEEPWATER IS
FUNDAMENTALLY ABOUT THE COAST GUARD'S ABILITY TO SAVE LIVES, SECURE
OUR MARITIME BORDERS AND PROTECT OUR MARINE ENVIRONMENT.
8. INTERNET RELEASE AUTHORIZED.
9. ADM THAD ALLEN SENDS.

And the link to the Miami Herald COMDT article

Thad Allen OpEd for Miami Herald (http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/opinion/16301178.htm)

I like the way this guy operates! Hope everyone had a great holiday, please be safe during New Years!
Dave

[BMCM Stuart S. Slesh]

So..... do we see a difference in the articles ? Some of them claim to have heard reports from Coast Guard "Leaders" ......... One of them was a report writing by the leader of the Coast Guard.
No smoke,... no mirrors,...this is what happened, ... and this is what we need to do about it.

I liked the whole thing,..... but I think that I'll be quoting this part for awhile...CRITICISMS OF THE DEEPWATER PROGRAM SHOULD NOT MASK THE PROGRESS WE ARE MAKING IN OTHER AREAS,....

[BMCS T. D. Ellis]

Obviously, SOMEBODY knew there were hull problems, and yet we continued down the merry path to completion. Why weren't these dealt with prior to accepting this white elephant? It's like entering port with one set of charts and then getting a new set on the way in with different drafts and channels.

I agree, someone will step up, cream rises to the top as you so eloquently put earlier, but why should it be here? Why couldn't it have been at the beginning? Why did we wait? :mad:

[BMCM Stuart S. Slesh]

Tim, you're still making assumptions. The story says SOME SHIP STRUCTURES REQUIRED STRENGTHENING TO INCREASE THE SERVICE LIFE OF THE SHIP.
What is that life ? Most Navy ships start off with a life expectancy of what ? Twenty years ? Say the engineers were designing her to last for ? Thirty Years ? but the Coast Guard Engineers already know that we're going to keep her floating until ships fly and James T. Kirk gets one. The Coast Guard engineer knows that if we're planning on keeping her around for longer that she's designed to be around,.... their going to have to strengthen her hull.
Now I know, I just assumed that whole thing, but it seems more logically to me than the Coast Guard, that I know, would send huge sums of money I something they knew would work.
Go back through our own history. How long were the 180's designed to stick around for ? How about the 110's ? The BERTHOLF will be around for alot longer than either one of us.

[PACS Steve Carleton]

The DHS OIG Report is out on the National Security Cutter.

In case you feel like reading through it, Follow the link:

http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-23_Jan07.pdf

This is an excerpt from the Executive Sumary

The NSC, as designed and constructed, will not meet performance
specifications described in the original Deepwater contract. Specifically, due to design deficiencies, the NSC’s structure provides insufficient fatigue strength to be deployed underway for 230 days per year over its 30-year operational service life under Caribbean (General Atlantic) and Gulf of Alaska (North Pacific) sea conditions. Coast Guard technical experts believe the NSC’s design deficiencies will also increase the cutter’s maintenance costs and reduce its service life. To mitigate the effects of these deficiencies, the Coast Guard intends to modify the NSC’s design to support an operational profile of 170 to 180 days underway per year in the North Pacific region, lower than the 230-day performance standard required by the Deepwater contract.

The NSC’s design and performance deficiencies are fundamentally the result
of the Coast Guard’s failure to exercise technical oversight over the design and construction of its Deepwater assets. The Coast Guard’s technical experts first identified and presented their concerns about the NSC’s structural design to senior Deepwater Program management in December 2002, but this did not dissuade the Coast Guard from authorizing production of the NSC in June 2004 or from awarding ICGS a contract extension in May 2006.

Since the Deepwater contract was signed in June 2002, the combined cost of
NSCs 1 and 2 has increased from $517 million to approximately $775 million,
resulting primarily from design changes necessary to meet post 9/11 mission
requirements and other government costs not included in the original contract
price. The $775 million estimate does not include costs to correct or mitigate
the NSC’s structural design deficiencies, additional labor and materials costs
resulting from the effects of Hurricane Katrina, and the final cost of a $302
million Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA) that the Coast Guard is
currently negotiating with ICGS.

[DCCS Brett Wickett]

I am not a ship design engineer by any way shape or form but why can ship building companies all over the world build ships all over the world that float in water all over the world and we can't seem to build one that works anywhere? Is it because we continually try to get something for nothing? Not that I am calling 775 million nothing. Does the Navy have this much problem trying to get a ship to work for them? Not only does this put an unsafe feeling on the crews, it is an embarassment to our service. It embarasses me everytime someone on the street asks me about these types of things. I don't know, I guess if I didn't care it wouldn't bother me.

[DCCS Keith Wilbee]

More bad publicity on NBC News tonight about the new national Security Cutter as well. Under the title of fleecing of america.

[DCCS Keith Wilbee]

The Coast Guard’s technical experts first identified and presented their concerns about the NSC’s structural design to senior Deepwater Program management in December 2002, but this did not dissuade the Coast Guard from authorizing production of the NSC in June 2004 or from awarding ICGS a contract extension in May 2006.

This explains it all to me Brett.

[BMCS Jim Madsen]

I haven't read the whole report, but as I browsed, I found this interesting: "According to the terms of the contract, it is ICGS, and not the Coast Guard, which has full technical authority over all Deepwater asset design and construction decisions. In a June 2001 Memorandum, the Commandant expressly limited the Coast Guard’s technical role to “providing expertise and credible advice in core integrated engineering and logistics
competencies” and assigned this role to subject matter experts from the Coast Guard’s Systems Directorate.5 The primary mechanism by which the Coast Guard provides expertise and credible advice to ICGS concerning the design of Deepwater assets is the Integrated Product Team (IPT)."
It would be nice if the Coast Guard had technical experts that could evaluate these designs and oversee this, but when we transfer every 2-4 years, it is awfully hard to maintain the continuity for a project like this. Also, it seems to me that it is time to quit playing "uncle deep pockets" and hold the contractors (ICGS) accountable for what they failed to provide. They keep wanting more money to fix what they didn't do right the first time... Admittedly, I only know very little of this whole fiasco, but it seems to me that this is a mess that was left behind by others that are probably long gone. I would expect a project of this size to have it's challenges, but not to be a failure.

[PACS Steve Carleton]

To the Men and Women of the Coast Guard:

When I released my Commandant’s Intent last May, I emphasized the importance of taking bold steps to advance the Deepwater Program acquisition for maritime presence, patrol, and response. The Deepwater acquisition of eight new Legend class National Security Cutters (NSC) is central to enabling you to execute your operational missions more effectively, efficiently, and safely.

As you are aware, questions have been raised in press reports regarding the structural integrity of the NSC. I want to set the record straight in very clear terms. Issues related to the construction of the NSC are not related to the safe operation of the vessel. Our concerns relate to structural fatigue over the course of its projected 30-year service life. They are being addressed. Internal reviews by our own engineers and independent third party analysts have concluded that the vessel as currently designed will need structural reinforcement to meet its service life.

Armed with this knowledge and after a thorough technical review, I have directed that RADM Gabel and RADM Blore develop a plan to insure the service life of the NSC will be met. We are in the process of developing that plan with Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS). I have also affirmed the role of RADM Gabel, the Assistant Commandant for Engineering & Logistics (CG-4), as the Technical Authority related to Coast Guard acquisitions. As stated in COMDTINST 4700.4 “Technical authority is the authority, responsibility, and accountability to establish, monitor, and approve technical standards, tools, and processes .…”

The structural enhancements to improve the fatigue life of the first two NSCs, CGC BERTHOLF and CGC WAESCHE, do not have to be done immediately; plans are to complete them during a yard availability after they are delivered. For NSCs 3 – 8, fatigue concerns will be addressed through pre-construction design changes.

Consistent with what I have told you at All Hands meetings, I will communicate directly with you when needed, and we will never back away from hard questions. External scrutiny from the Inspector General and other overseers will raise questions on the Deepwater acquisition throughout its life. As public servants, we are not only subject to their oversight, but it is a central feature of the appropriation process. I welcome external review, as it enables us to improve our processes, be more effective stewards of taxpayer dollars, and better serve the American public.

I am confident the NSC and the Deepwater Program are on the correct course and will testify before Congress in the coming weeks. My statement for the record for each of these hearings will be posted at the Commandant’s Corner on the Web (www.uscg.mil/comdt) and on CG Central. I encourage all of you to read these statements as they will clearly communicate my priorities for the Deepwater program.

I look forward to taking delivery of the first-in-class CGC BERTHOLF later this year. You should be excited about that, too. The NSC’s 21st-century capabilities will enable us to perform our vital missions more effectively, efficiently, and safely.

As I have said many times, each of you, regardless of where you sit in our organization, is critical to mission success. You must have the tools and support you need to do your job. We will ensure Coast Guard men and women are the best trained and most versatile workforce in government, equipped with the most capable fleet of multi-mission ships, aircraft, boats, and command-and-control systems available.

Semper Paratus!
Admiral Thad Allen

[BMCS Jim Madsen]

You have gotta love a COMDT that communicates with his people at all levels. While we all may have our own opinions, and we are entitled to them, we also have the word from the top of what is, what isn't, and what is going to be. I don't think anyone could ask for more. Has a COMDT ever extended?

[PACS Steve Carleton]

Has a COMDT ever extended?

Sheesh Jim, let the man finish year number 1 of 4 before we start talking extension.

[SKC Ronald Brumble]

I have to agree Jim. This COMDT Rocks!! I like his style. :D

[BMCM Deane Smith]

He should be able to remain COMDT until he can become our POTUS!

[GMCM Bill Wells (Ret)]

I don't think anyone could ask for more. Has a COMDT ever extended?

Several times but not since WWII. Adm. Waesche was the last. He served 12 years as Commandant.

As a historian of Coast Guard topics, I have noticed that whenever the Coast Guard, or RCS, made any meaning strides forward there was a long term commandant.

The first "Deepwater" was begun in the 1890s under Captain Charles Shoemaker, who served from 1895 - 1904. He oversaw the moderization of the cutter fleet and the creation of the "naval" identity of the service. He not only overhauled the fleet (building some 20 new cutters) but he overhauled the officer corps. He knew that ships were only instruments and without a cohesive officer corps the Service would fail.

RAdm. R. R. Waesche also oversaw the next large, to use a popular term, "transformation." On his watch, he oversaw the building of 20 new cutters in five years, the creation of moderan aviation, and of course, changing the relationship of the Coast Guard with the navy during WWII from an assimilated service to a service within the Navy Department. He too, began building a more efficient officer corps. However, more importantly, he created the career enlisted corps.

Prior to Waesche, the enlisted corps were largely "hired" people some on one-year contracts. The Service culture had never needed professional enlisted people because good seamen were available for hire. The officer corps were the technical experts on the gear and they did most of the repairs. This changed in the 1930s because the officer corps was capped at about 850 and they could not longer keep up with the increasing amounts of technology for ships, communications, and aircraft. He had to turn to creating a professional enlisted corps and thanks to WWII, this corps remains to this point in history. The adoption of a professional enlisted corps also placed the Coast Guard on par with the navy-- this being comparable to the navy was a large factor in that era.

I doubt Allen will be extended. It is a nice thought, but to keep him would produce some stagnation in the officer corps. Don't forget the officer corps eliminted the extra 10% for enlisted good conduct retirement in 1964 to pay for the change in their promotion system.

[ETC (FT type) Ed Shank]

First let me start by saying that I think Adm. Allen is trying to do the right thing and is in a very tough situation that is not all his fault. However there is one easy to find, signifigant discrepancy between his testimony to Congress and other information that has been published regarding the NSC.

In his testimony to Congress regarding the structural intergrity of the NSC he contradicts what Headquarters has published. The report questions the 30 year life span based upon the hull designs. Adm. Allen disagreed due to the inspector general's report basing the life expectancy on 230 days at sea. Adm. Allen responded saying the vessel would only be patrolling 170-180 days a year and that it was an "issue of contract interpretation" and that we were "buying more performance then needed".

The deepwater webpage contains the crew rotation concept that has been signed stating that the PERSTEMPO will be 170-180 days a year while the OPTEMPO for the cutter remains at 230 days.

So which one is it? 180 days as testified to Congress or 230 days as the ship was designed, built and funding approved by Congress? I think before we hand over the POTUS job, who is critized endlessly for misleading people, we need to see how this all works out in the end.

[GMC Larry Muldowney]

Good Morning,
Being attached to the Bertholfs "crew Alpha" I have to sit here and laugh sometimes.

We (the Coast Guard and the COMDT) have stated that the NSC's were supposed to be designed to be underway for 230 DAFHP (Days away From Home Port) not 230 days underway doing the mission. This 230 days is only IF the crew roatation works. The OPtempo and the Perstempo are different.
This figure is also in our Org manual that is on RCU's Cg website.

If we did as the OIG says and we are underway doing the mission for 230 days a year then add in the 20 days or so thagt a cutter tranisit that would put the NSC's away from home port at 250 days a year.

Larry

[GMCM Bill Wells (Ret)]

Larry,

There used to be a requirement for WHECs to be underway 210 days a year, exclusive of transit time. This would amount to about the same.

[ETC (FT type) Ed Shank]

The OIG based his findings on 230 days at sea. The CG has the OPTEMPO at 230 days. OPTEMPO is u/w. You mention that this is IF the crew rotation works. If it doesn't, we have a bunch of people with no billets then. This concept has been approved for use on these ship's. If crew rotation doesn't work, and we can only do 180 days u/w, how are we going to meet the mission requirements? We are already replacing 10 boats with 8, and still have to meet more missions today then just a few years ago. Without increasing the OPTEMPO (u/w days) we can't meet the requirements. With the necessary OPTEMPO, the ship's won't last. Something has to give, and it will be the NSC, and the CG's good reputation.

[GMC Larry Muldowney]

The OIG based his findings on 230 days at sea. The CG has the OPTEMPO at 230 days. OPTEMPO is u/w. You mention that this is IF the crew rotation works. If it doesn't, we have a bunch of people with no billets then. This concept has been approved for use on these ship's. If crew rotation doesn't work, and we can only do 180 days u/w, how are we going to meet the mission requirements? We are already replacing 10 boats with 8, and still have to meet more missions today then just a few years ago. Without increasing the OPTEMPO (u/w days) we can't meet the requirements. With the necessary OPTEMPO, the ship's won't last. Something has to give, and it will be the NSC, and the CG's good reputation.

The OPTEMPO is 230 DAFHP not DAYS underway doing mission (there is a huge differance.) as the COMDT has already stated. This info can be found on the intranet at RCU's web site

Can not help you on the whole crew rotation question. I will be here until summer of 2009 and the crew rotation will not fully start until them. The few "delta" folks we have here now are treated as Crew "alpha" and are getting fully qualifed unitl the rotation starts. I hope the crew rotation concept works but I will probably not see it.
Larry